Originally published in the Sunday Gleaner 22 June 2025

Government members on the Parliament’s Joint Select Committee reviewing the Integrity Commission Act, have voted in favour of a recommendation to remove Jamaica’s Auditor General (AG) as a statutory member of the Integrity Commission (IC). Unsurprisingly, the recommendation has been the subject of much public debate.

Such a significant policy change would be well served by an objective process, similar to a cost-benefit analysis, that weighs what’s to be gained against what’s to be lost and is driven by evidence. Regrettably, what transpired in the Parliament last Tuesday fell a good deal short of such a process. To be clear, the Jamaica Accountability Meter Portal (JAMP) is not suggesting that no circumstances could ever warrant the AG’s removal, rather, we are asserting that the reasons offered, did not stand up to scrutiny.

Let us revisit the arguments proffered.

The Conflict of Interest Claim Some MPs doggedly argued that a conflict of interest exists because the Auditor General should be auditing the Integrity Commission. The fact is that no such ‘should’ exists in the Law. Section 20(1) of the very Act under review says the “accounts shall be audited annually by an auditor appointed in each year by the Commission with the approval of the Minister”.  The IC is compliant with this requirement.

The Budget Oversight Argument Another member argued that the Commission requires the AG’s direct audit oversight because of the size of their budget. This assertion is to be put against the fact that other public bodies like the National Housing Trust and Port Authority of Jamaica with far greater budgets are audited annually by private firms. Why then is this concern limited to our anti-corruption body?

The Reporting Deficiency Claim Another member took a different angle – the House should “require the full force of the AG to investigate [sic audit] the Integrity Commission, to make it clear to parliament how the funds are being used.” The fact is there is no mystery about how the IC’s funding is used. Members need only read the IC’s annual reports all of which are located on the IC’s website and show the Commission to be fully compliant with Section 20(1) quoted above. Ironically, the member who put forward the view also sits on the Oversight Committee that is tasked with reviewing these very reports.

Missing Performance Audits Two MPs bemoaned the lack of performance reports and argued that they would be forthcoming if only the AG was not sitting as a commissioner. However, Section 20(1) of the Act does not limit the private auditor to financial statements and the Minister of Finance under the powers granted by the Financial Administration and Audit Act, can also instruct an audit firm to undertake a performance audit. No amendment to the IC Act is needed – just political will.

Constitutional Confusion Lastly and perhaps the strangest of all is the assertion that the Constitution bars the Auditor General from serving as a Commissioner. This was swiftly corrected by the Solicitor General with the reading and clarification of Section 120.3 of the Constitution.  

This debate transcends individual officials’ opinions. It’s about protecting institutions that protect public resources. It ought to be well grounded in the facts and take into account the actual historical record.

 So let us consider the record. Jamaica has had an Integrity Commission since 1973. The first, governed by the Parliament, Integrity of Members Act, looked at the statutory declarations for Parliamentarians only. That Commission was merged with the Office of the Contractor General and the Corruption Prevention Commission, creating the single Integrity Commission in 2017. Over these fifty-two years, successive Auditors General have served on the Commission without a single recorded incident of abuse or conflict. The current AG has served a combined 18 years—ten with the former Commission, eight with the current one. If any real or perceived harm existed, surely the committee members should be able to cite at least one example. They have not.

In short, what is recommended for dismantling is not a flawed structure – but a tested, resilient one.

At the sitting, Member Chuck suggested that retaining the AG as a Commissioner in 2017 was a “mere carry over” from the former IC. Rather than a slight legislative drafting oversight JAMP would like to believe that it was a strategic decision based on consideration of the value of the unique blend of technical expertise, institutional memory, and system-wide oversight that an auditor general would bring to the Commission’s mandate.

The Integrity Commission is mandated to “investigate acts of corruption and non-compliance” [Section 6.1.A] and “determine the extent of financial loss” [Section 6.1.N]. Auditors General bring to the IC technical training in auditing and financial investigations, tracing and quantifying public financial losses and evaluating the efficiency and propriety of public spending. This skill set allows the AG to strengthen the Commission’s ability to uncover, analyse, and explain the financial dimensions of corruption.

Section 6.1.D empowers the Commission to “examine practices and procedures of public bodies and recommend revisions”. This aligns well with an AG’s core function of identifying systemic weaknesses in internal controls, recommending reforms for greater efficiency, transparency, and compliance.

An AG, routinely audits a broad range of public bodies, including ministries, departments, statutory agencies, municipal bodies and projects involving international funding and procurement. This gives the AG a bird’s eye view of governance risks and malpractice patterns across government. This is essential intelligence for the Commission’s work, particularly in “monitoring and where necessary investigating the award, implementation and termination of government contracts” (Section 6.1.f) and “monitoring current legislative and administrative practices in the fight against corruption” (Section 6.1.h).

According to public records, nine parliamentarians (not eight) are currently under investigation for illicit enrichment. The Jamaican public have no idea who eight of those are yet much of what happens to this organisation could lie in the hands of some of those very parliamentarians when the debate and vote takes place in the Houses of Parliament. Therein lies the real potential for conflict of interest that we should address our minds to.

Each Commissioner brings to the process experience and training to help undergird different parts of the IC’s work. If changes are to be made to the structure they should demonstrably strengthen not weaken the capacity of the Commission to carry out its mandate.

The public deserves better than policy by speculation and opinions that are inconsistent with facts and track record. If there are credible reasons to amend the law, they should be based on verifiable risk. Until then, we invite all Jamaicans to join us in urging the Parliament to let evidence and reason prevail and retain the Auditor General as part of the structure of the Integrity Commission.